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Abstract
Increasing reliance on cyber-components for
communication and control has made cybersecurity
in power systems an increasing concern.
While
Information technology (IT) based detection and
prevention methods are deployed to detect cyber
threats, leveraging of the system physics provides a
complementary detection scheme. Here, we consider
malicious power order threats directed at a high-voltage
direct current (HVDC) line in a large AC network. A
fast, approximate tracking state estimation method
is investigated that uses a reduced iteration count
and measurement prioritization using power transfer
distribution factors (PTDF) to rapidly compute
the approximate injections at the AC buses of the
HVDC line as a power order is executed.
The
algorithm’s accuracy in tracking the system’s change is
investigated. It is observed that with the above methods,
the estimator can achieve results within 5% of the true
injection. Deviations from the expected injection can
be understood to be indicative of a compromised power
order.

1.

Introduction

There is concern that increasing reliance of power
systems on cyber components for communication and
control exposes a cyber attack surface that may be
exploited to cause adverse system impacts. While
it is possible, and advisable, to include intrusion
detection/prevention systems (IDS/IPS) to verify the
source, destination, and syntax of the protocol
messages, leveraging knowledge of the power system
network provides a complementary detection capability.
Transmission operators can use knowledge of the power
network topology and the underlying physical laws that
govern the system to their advantage to detect and
potentially mitigate suspicious system operation. In
this study, we propose such a complementary detection
mechanism and use it to examine the scenario of a large
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AC power system with a high-voltage direct current
(HVDC) link. Specifically, we seek to detect malicious
cyber threats directed at the power order command
in conjunction with spoofed measurements from the
HVDC stations.
In a large power system, such an HVDC link can be
used to transfer power from one region of the network
to another during times of high demand to help ease
congestion. Typically, in such instances, the system
operator’s control center (SOCC) sends a power order
command over a communication channel to the sending
end converter control station (CCS) for a certain amount
of power to be exported on the HVDC line. This order
is then executed by the operator at the CCS. At the
receiving end, the inverter control station (ICS) receives
the power, converts it back into AC power, and injects
it into the AC network. In this situation, there exists a
possibility that an attacker will intercept the power order
command and alter it to a malicious value, while also
spoofing the feedback measurements from the HVDC
station, so that the power order execution appears correct
to the control center. An execution of this altered power
order can jeopardize the safe operation of the system.
Thus, it is critical to develop means to ensure that such
an intrusion and attack can be detected before it is too
late. That will require an ability to rapidly track a
system’s evolution in time as a power order is executed.
That way, if the order has been maliciously altered, it
can be detected in a short time span so that swift action
can be taken to stop the continued execution of the
malicious power order.
The detection scheme being proposed utilizes real
and reactive line flow measurements to perform state
estimation based on weighted least squares (WLS). The
resulting state can then be used to estimate the expected
power injections at the AC buses connected to the
HVDC converter and inverter stations. If the injections
are found to be significantly different—accounting
for measurement noise, communication latency, and
estimation error—from the expected value for a given
power order execution, they can be flagged as potentially
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compromised executions. As part of the the scope of this
study, we make a few assumptions:
1. The communication links between the control
center and the HVDC stations are considered
compromised, while the communication from the
larger AC grid is assumed to be trustworthy, but
with non-malicious measurement errors that are
normally distributed with zero bias.
2. The measurements from the CCS and ICS are
compromised and none of them can be trusted.
3. The system topology does not change in the time
period in which the power order is executed.
4. The system has the generating capability to
provide for this power export. At every set point
of the HVDC line, the system does not exhibit any
small-time scale dynamic behavior.
Those assumptions define the scope of our work.
The contributions of this paper are the development
of approximation techniques to enable sufficiently
accurate state estimation, and quantitative evaluation of
these techniques as applied to cyber threat detection in
power systems. While our analysis is in the context of
an HVDC system in a larger AC system, our techniques
are applicable to any power system situation, such as
generator dispatch for which an expected impact of
a major operation on a wider transmission system is
physically modeled and the operation itself is potentially
subject to cyber attack.

2.

Our Approach

To emulate realistic conditions of an operating power
system that sends data to a control center, which then
receives and processes the information appropriately,
it is desirrable to have one platform that serves as
a proxy of the real power system and another that
serves the role of the computational platform at the
SOCC. In our modeling, we use the network model on
the PowerWorld Simulator platform [1] as a stand-in
for the real system. For a DC power order executed
on this system, the power flow is computed for a
sequence of points along the power injection ramp that
are equally spaced in time as the power order evolves,
progressively going from zero to full rating. For brevity,
these points will be referred to as set points of the
HVDC line. The set points are defined in terms of
the DC current (IDC ) that results in a desired DC
power flow on the HVDC line. Real and reactive line
flow measurements obtained from the power flow for
each set point are then exported in comma-separated

values (.csv) format to a computational platform—in
this case, MATLAB—which serves as a stand-in
for the computational platform at the SOCC. The
measurements are used in a weighted least squares
(WLS) formulation to determine the state of the
system. We utilize the MATPOWER set of open-source
scripts [2] for the power system computational aspects,
with modifications as needed to implement the fast,
approximate tracking state estimation method. Once
an estimate for the state is found, it can be used to
compute the real power injections at the AC buses
connected to the converter and inverter station. For an
approved power order, the estimated injections should
conform—within a margin of error—to those expected
for the power order being executed. Any deviations
from the expected injection profile would be indicative
of a power order that is either incorrectly received or
incorrectly executed.
Given that a large system has the ability to
output a correspondingly large set of measurements
at every instant in time, and that full state estimation
may not be computationally feasible in the available
time budget, some approximations and means of
prioritization of measurements are required in order
to achieve an estimate of sufficient accuracy within
a short computational time for detection purposes.
The prioritization of measurements also reflects the
real-life scenario where measurements are received
asynchronously and thus only a small subset of
measurements can be received in a specific time instant
that corresponds approximately to a static system
operating point. The contributions of this paper are
the identification of approximation techniques to enable
sufficiently accurate state estimation and quantitative
evaluation of these techniques as applied to cyber threat
detection in power systems.
The two modifications we have made to the state
estimation algorithm are capping of the maximum
number of iterations and the prioritization of
measurements, according to the power transfer
distribution factor (PTDF). The approach of capping
the maximum number of iterations for power system
state estimation for the purpose of faster cyber threat
detection in real time system operation was studied in
[3]. Leveraging on that work, we have extended the
approach by adding prioritization of measurements
that uses PTDF analysis to account for issues caused
by communication latency and slower computational
times due to large system state estimations in real time.
PowerWorld was also used for calculation of the PTDFs
used in this study.
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3.

Methodology

3.2.

In this section, we discuss the specific case chosen
to investigate our approach. The steps required for
the implementation of the fast, approximate state
estimation-based approach are also elaborated upon.

3.1.

Case Under Study

The system under study is a synthetic system
that approximates the US part of the Western
Interconnection, managed by the Western Electrical
Coordinating Council (WECC). The synthetic case file
is the 10,000-bus case created and maintained at the
Electric Grid Test Case Repository at TAMU, available
online at [4]. The cases maintained in the repository
were created based on an approach laid out in [5]. An
HVDC line that is comparable to the Pacific DC intertie
is modeled in the 10,000-bus case at synthetic buses that
correspond closely to the geographical location of the
converter and inverter stations in the physical WECC
system. The HVDC converter station is modeled as
current-controlled, while the HVDC inverter station is
modeled as voltage-controlled. The capacity of the line
is 3100 MW, which corresponds to a DC set point IDC
of 6200 A. We consider a linear ramp rate for the DC
power injection under which the line is ramped from
zero to full rating in 20 minutes, resulting in a ramp rate
of 155 MW/min. The system is capable of a faster ramp
rate, but we believe the operation we chose is typical,
based on discussions with a utility operating a similar
system. Our techniques do not require a linear ramp
rate. Since the real Pacific DC intertie is connected
to the physical AC grid at 230 kV, the 10,000-bus
system is equivalenced to retain transmission lines of
voltage levels 230 kV and above. That results in a
reduced system of approximately 2500 buses. External
generators are retained. The equivalencing was done in
PowerWorld. Table 1 lists the system characteristics for
the original as well as the reduced network.

Table 1. Result of reduction operation on the
original system

System

Original

Reduced

Parameter

WECC case

WECC case

Number of Buses

10,000

2,470

Number of Lines

12,706

5,375

AC State Estimation Theory

The classical state estimation technique adapted for
use in power systems, first proposed by Schweppe
[6][7][8], is a weighted least squares (WLS) problem
formulation. The formulation below closely follows the
one described by Abur and Expósito in [9]. Given a
set of m measurements and n states (where m > n),
considering the vector of measurements z ∈ Rm and its
associated measurement error vector e, we can write the
corresponding relation between the two:
z = h(x) + e

(1)

Here, h(·) : Rn → Rm is the nonlinear function that
relates the measurements to the vector of states denoted
by x ∈ Rn . The assumptions made for the errors in the
measurements are:
1. The expected value of the error is 0, i.e,
E(ei ) = 0, i = 1, . . . , m.
2. Measurement errors are independent, i.e.
E[ei ej ] = 0 =⇒
R = Cov(e) = E[e · e> ]
2
},
= diag{σ12 , σ22 , · · · , σm
where σi is the standard deviation of the ith
measurement, which reflects the expected accuracy of
the corresponding meter used to take the measurement.
The WLS estimator minimizes the following objective
function:
J(x) =

m
X
(zi − hi (x))2

σi2

i=1

,

(2)

which can be written in matrix notation as
J(x) = [z − h(x)]> R−1 [z − h(x)]

(3)

At the function minimum, the first-order optimality
condition needs to be satisfied. This means that
g(x) =

∂J(x)
>
= −H(x) R−1 [z − h(x)] = 0 (4)
∂x


∂h(x)
Here, H(x) =
. Expansion of the left side of
∂x


the nonlinear function g(x) in (4) using the Taylor series
around the state vector xk yields:
k

k

k

g(x) = g(x ) + G(x )(x − x ) + · · · = 0

(5)
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Here, G(x) =


∂g(x)
. From (4), we can write
∂x

k

G(x ) as:
k

∂g(x )
∂ 2 J(xk )
k
k
= H(x )> R−1 H(x )
=
∂x
∂x2
(6)
Substituting (6) into (5) and neglecting the higher-order
terms, we obtain:
k

G(x ) =

k

k

k

g(x ) + H(x )> R−1 H(x )(x − xk ) = 0

(7)

Upon substitution of (4) into (7) and rearranging, we
have:
k

k

k

k

H(x )> R−1 H(x )(x − xk ) = H(x )> R−1 [z−h(x )]
(8)
The above equation can be solved iteratively, in the form
as shown below:
k

k

k

G(x )(∆xk+1 ) = H(x )> R−1 [z − h(x )]

(9)

where ∆xk+1 = xk+1 − xk and k is the iteration index.
Equation (9) is typically solved using sparse matrix
methods, along with triangular factorization followed by
forward and backward substitution, as described in [10].

3.3.

Tracking AC State Estimation Theory

The above formulation is the time-invariant case
in which the state estimates are extracted from a
single scan of measurements. It can be modified
to reflect operations in real-time systems based on a
time sequence of “snapshots” of systems measurements,
referred to as a “tracking state estimator” by Monticelli
[11]. Equation (1) can then be modified to
z(ti ) = h(x(ti )) + e(ti )

solving the power flow of the network at 15-second
intervals, for a total of 81 equidistant “snapshots” of the
system as the power flow varies. Thus, for every time
instant i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , T , there is an associated DC set
point IDCi that is determined by the ramp rate. This
way of solving the power flow also means that for i =
0, 1, 2, . . . , T , we generate a sequence of measurement
snapshots z(t1 ), z(t2 ), . . . , z(tT ). Each measurement
snapshot, consisting of the real and reactive power flow
from the sending and receiving end of each line, is
exported in a .csv format, thus generating a set of
measurements of the quasi-steady state of the system at
each set point. We also recorded the real power injection
at the AC buses connected to the converter and inverter
buses. That serves as the result of the power flow against
which the state estimate values are compared.
For each time interval ∆t = ti − ti−1 , we limit the
number of iterations in the state estimation to k max . For
measurements at each time step, the iterative process
indicated by (9) is continued as long as k ≤ k max , after
which the time step is advanced to ti+1 , and the process
is repeated.
The tracking state estimation process is now
modified to incorporate the prioritization technique.
The measurement vector z(ti ) at each time step ti
is considered to be made up of two non-intersecting
subsets of measurements, referred to as prioritized
measurements (of size Rmp ) and non-prioritized
measurements (of size Rmp̄ ). At a given time instant ti ,
the elements zj (ti ), where j ∈ mp of z(ti ), are received
in real time, while the elements zj (ti ), where j ∈ mp̄ ,
are computed based on the state estimate x̂(ti−1 ) from
the previous time instant ti−1 . As these non-prioritized
measurements are not true measurements received from
the system, we refer to them as pseudo-measurements.

(10)

for i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , where z(ti ) is the measurement
vector corresponding to time ti ; x(ti ) is the state
vector at ti ; and e(ti ) is the zero mean, orthogonal
(uncorrelated in time) vector with variance given by
(
>

E{e(ti )e (tj )} =

R(ti ), ti = tj
0,
ti 6= tj

(11)

We executed the DC power order on the HVDC
line for equidistant IDC set points spaced at 77.5 A,
monotonically increasing from 0 A (zero current flow)
to 6200 A (maximum current flow)—corresponding to
the real power flow on the line increasing from 0 MW
to 3100 MW. For a ramp time of 20 minutes and linear
ramp rate, the power order execution is equivalent to

Figure 1. Graphical depiction of the process of
incorporating pseudo-measurements with real-time
measurements.

Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the
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process. The components of the measurement vector
z(t), indicated in red, are the prioritized transmission
lines for which measurements are received in real-time.
The previous estimate of the state is utilized to generate
pseudo-measurements for all other transmission lines,
indicated in green. The combined hybrid measurement
vector is then passed on to the state estimator to generate
x̂(ti ) at time step ti . The process is then repeated at the
next time step.
In effect, this process models the real-life scenario
wherein the SOCC only has the ability to receive a
very small set of measurements from the large system
because of a limited number of metered nodes and lines
where measurements are available.

all other entries are zero. The product Ψi,j ∆Pinj then
gives a vector of line flow changes ∆Pl that can be
normalized and sorted. Upon sorting those values for the
2470-bus, 5400-line reduced WECC case, we observed
that a very large number of lines have a PTDF value
near 0, and only about 50 lines have PTDF over 10%.
This can be explained by understanding that for a given
power transfer occurring between a set of two buses in
the system, a small subset of lines will end up carrying a
majority of the exchanged power, while the line flow of
a large number of lines will be minimally affected.

3.4.

4.1.

The Use of Power Transfer Distribution
Factors (PTDF) for Prioritization

The prioritization of measurements should be
conducted using a metric that reflects the relative
importance of elements in the power system network.
The metrics considered for use in this prioritization
scheme are a particular class of linearized sensitivity
factors, outlined by Wollenberg and Wood in [12],
called the power transfer distribution factors (PTDF),
as investigated by Sauer [13]. PTDF is one among
a class of distribution factors that are used for rapid
contingency screening. PTDFs are a measure of how
power injection at a specific bus in the network is
distributed across the various transmission lines in the
network. The formulation of a PTDF matrix is specific
to a particular bus i with respect to a choice of reference
bus r. Through the use of DC approximations in
power systems [14], the following linear relation can be
written:

4.

Results
Measurement Prioritization

The PTDF analysis was done in PowerWorld. The
lines were then sorted in descending order by the PTDF
value. The determination of the acceptable threshold
value was done by examining the trade-off in including
fewer lines and the resulting estimates for the power
injections at either end of the HVDC line. It was
noted that as the set of prioritized measurements was
increased, the estimates were generally found to become
more accurate, at the cost of having to meter more lines,
which in a physical system corresponds to increased
costs for metering and larger data sets to be processed
at every time step. Table 2 shows the number of lines
that need to be considered for a particular threshold of
PTDF value.
Table 2. Size of prioritized measurement set as a
function of PTDF threshold

PTDF Threshold [%]

Number of Selected Lines

(12)

5%

135

where ∆Pinj ∈ RNb is the vector of real power
injection at the Nb buses in the system, ∆Pl ∈ RNl
is the vector of changes in the real power flow across
the Nl lines in the system, and Ψi,r is the PTDF matrix
for the given choice of reference bus. Equation (12)
describes the real power flow change in a line flow for
a unit of real power exchange between bus i and the
reference bus. To understand the distribution of line flow
changes between two buses i and j in the network, the
PTDF matrix Ψi,j can be computed by:

10%

51

15%

28

20%

21

25%

14

30%

6

35%

5

40%

4

45%

1

Ψi,j = Ψi,r − Ψj,r

50%

1

∆Pl = Ψi,r ∆Pinj ,

(13)

For the specific case under study, the buses i and j are
the AC buses to which the converter and inverter stations
of the HVDC system are connected. As a result, only
the ith and jth element in ∆Pinj are nonzero, while

The errors in the estimate results were computed as
the PTDF threshold was varied. The error metric used
here is the relative error, defined as follows:
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LF
SE
Pinj,i
− Pinj,i
Error =
LF
Pinj,i

(14)

LF
Here, Pinj,i
is the injection as computed from the load
SE
flow results, and Pinj,i
is the injection computed based
on the state estimate at the time instant ti . It is also often
expressed as a percentage.

Error in SE Result at Inverter Bus [%]

102
PTDF Threshold = 5%
PTDF Threshold = 10%
PTDF Threshold = 15%
PTDF Threshold = 20%
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7000

Figure 2. Comparison of the errors in the inverter
end power as the PTDF threshold was varied.

As this point, we should make a short note regarding
the choice of using DC PTDFs instead of linearized
AC PTDFs. DC PTDFs are computed based on the
system topology and the use of the DC approximations,
while the linearized AC PTDF is computed based on the
system topology and the system’s operating point. Thus,
the computation of the AC PTDF requires real-time
computation, while the DC PTDF can be a truly offline
analysis that is invariant with respect to the system’s
operating point as long as the network topology does not
change. DC PTDF therefore minimizes the amount of
real-time computation that needs to be performed. There
is some difference between the distribution factors with
changes in system loading, as mentioned by Baldick
in [15], who also provides certain criteria that ensure
that the variability in the distribution factors is low.
Furthermore, our use of PTDF in the study is not for
the purpose of understanding line flow changes, but to
inform our decision regarding which lines to prioritize
for measurements. We are more concerned with the
identification of the important lines than with the PTDF
values of those lines.
Table 3. Size of prioritized subset of lines for AC vs.
DC PTDF

PTDF [%]

AC PTDF

DC PTDF

Common
Lines

Error in SE Result at Converter Bus [%]

10

1

100
PTDF Threshold = 5%
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PTDF Threshold = 15%
PTDF Threshold = 20%
10
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7000

Figure 3. Comparison of the errors in the converter
end power as the PTDF threshold was varied.

From the variation in the estimates due to changes
in the threshold as seen in Figures 2 and 3, the error is
found to be most well-behaved in both the converter and
inverter cases when the PTDF threshold is 10%. This
provided for sufficient accuracy and minimal variability
across set points, while also keeping the number of
prioritized (and therefore metered) lines to a minimum.
Recall that the system has approximately 5400 lines,
so fewer than 1% of the lines are considered for
prioritization.

5%

143

135

129

10%

56

51

49

15%

32

28

26

20%

24

21

20

25%

17

14

13

30%

8

6

6

35%

5

5

5

40%

5

4

4

45%

3

1

1

50%

1

1

1

For a chosen threshold value, we noticed a slight
discrepancy in the number of lines that need to be
considered depending on whether the AC or DC PTDF
is used. Table 3 shows the number of lines that are
shortlisted for a given PTDF threshold depending on
whether the DC or AC PTDF is used. It can also be
noted that the size of the set of lines common to both
DC and AC PTDF sets is slightly smaller than the size
of either the DC PTDF or the AC PTDF set. The use
of the DC PTDF results in a selection of a slightly lower
number of lines being selected than the AC PTDF would
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produce. Keeping the longer-term implementation in
mind, the DC PTDF identifies a fixed subset of lines
(invariant of the system’s operating point) for which the
communication channels would need to be upgraded and
hardened to resist cyberattacks. Therefore, we used the
DC PTDFs.

4.2.

Determination of the Reduced Iteration
Count

The determination of the reduced iteration count
k max was based on an analysis similar to that conducted
for the variation of the results with the PTDF threshold.
For a specific value of k max , the relative error was
calculated at every current set point. The error was
expected to reduce as the value of k max was increased.
The error was observed to converge to a nonzero value
for every set point. We investigated the marginal
reduction in error as k max was increased.

Error in SE Result at Inverter Bus [%]

102
Maximum Iterations = 1
Maximum Iterations = 2
Maximum Iterations = 3
Maximum Iterations = 4
Maximum Iterations = 5
Maximum Iterations = 100

101

100

10-1

0

1000

2000 3000 4000 5000
DC Current Set Point [A]

6000

7000

Error in SE Result at Converter Bus [%]

Figure 4. Variation of the error magnitude at the
inverter end as a function of the maximum iterations
allowed.
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Figure 5. Variation of the error magnitude at the
converter end as a function of the maximum
iterations allowed.

Figures 4 and 5 show the variation of the state
estimation error at the converter end (sending end) and
the inverter end (receiving end) as k max is varied. It
can be noted that for some set point values, the error
is found to be lower at lower values of k max . That
indicates that there are ranges of the DC set point for
which convergence is reached a lot sooner. It can also
be seen that within a relatively small iteration count, the
estimates converge to a steady value, which is reflected
by the overlap of several data points, particularly for
higher values of real power flow on the HVDC line.
Another factor that influences the selection of k max
and requires attention is the time interval between time
steps of measurements (which we refer to as the polling
interval). If the time required per iteration of the state
estimation algorithm is denoted by τ , a k max should
be chosen such that τ k max < ∆t. A smaller polling
interval means that the differences in system state
between successive time steps is small, which results in
a lower error in estimates, but also means that less time
is available for state estimation computation. Therefore,
while a shorter polling interval is desirable, it needs
to be balanced to ensure that it does not significantly
reduce the maximum number of allowed iterations. The
observed value of τ was found to be bounded above by
0.1 s across all injection values.
We can observe that for values of k max > 5,
the marginal reduction in error is almost negligible.
In Figures 4 and 5, the results for k max =5 are
indistinguishable from the results for k max =100.
Therefore, the lowest number of iterations that result in
an acceptable error margin in the neighborhood of the
true power flow solution is used to set the value of k max .

4.3.

Tracking State Estimator Accuracy

In this section, we investigate the accuracy of the
tracking state estimator for a PTDF threshold and k max
chosen based on the analysis in the previous sections.
Based on the results shown in Figures 6 and 7, it can
be seen that the tracking state estimator provides good
agreement with the results of the power flow as the flow
on the DC line is changed. It can be seen that the state
estimator is able to track the changes in power injection
with a good degree of accuracy. One thing to note is that
the estimates are consistently lower than the injections
computed from the load flow. That can be attributed
to the correspondence of the prioritized measurements
to a time instant ti , while the pseudo-measurements are
computed based on the state estimate at the time instant
ti−1 . The state estimation is therefore attempting to
compute one single state that minimizes the weighted
sum of square errors, where the measurements are
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Figure 8 shows results of the relative error of
the estimates. The error at the converter end is
approximately 2%, while the error at the inverter end
is approximately 10% at the start of the injection,
eventually reducing to about 1%.

3000
2500
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4.4.

1000
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0
-500

PowerWorld Load Flow
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0

5

10
Time [min]
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Figure 6. Comparison of the state estimation results
with the load flow results at the inverter end of the
HVDC line.
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Threat
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Based on the results obtained from the tracking
state estimator for the fast, approximate state estimation
process, we performed a preliminary investigation of
its ability to track a compromised power order. The
initial power flow along the HVDC line was set to
1000 MW, and a power order of 1000 MW was set
to be executed, for a final expected line flow of 2000
MW. That information allowed the SOCC to ascertain
the expected injection and withdrawal profile at the
converter and inverter buses, respectively. At execution,
that order was corrupted to a higher value chosen to be
between the intended final line flow and the maximum
line capacity. The output of the state estimator was then
observed as the corrupted power order was executed.
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Figure 7. Comparison of the state estimation results
with the load flow results at the converter end of the
HVDC line.
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Figure 9. State estimation tracking for a corrupted
power order of 1500MW. Polling interval = 15 s, and
kmax = 5.
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Figure 8. The relative error between the state
estimate and load flow result at the converter and
inverter end of the HVDC line.

From Figure 9, we see that that state estimation
tracked the state of the power system very closely.
Having gained an understanding of the behavior of the
errors in the previous section, we can gain insight on
how to identify the improper execution of a power
order based on the behavior of the error as the system
state changes. In Figure 10, we see that as the state
corresponding to the intended final flow on the line is
passed, the error in the estimate begins to grow.
An increase in the errors as seen in Figure 10
is highly suggestive of a compromised or improperly
executed power order.
A related profile that can be studied to track the
system’s evolution in time is the successive estimate
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Figure 10. Observed error in state estimation results
for the corrupted power order.

Successive Estimate Difference Rate (SEDR) [MW/s]

difference rate (SEDR), which is the difference between
the power injection estimates computed at ti and ti−1
divided by the time interval ti − ti−1 . Figure 11 shows
the SEDR profile for the simulated corrupt power order.
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Figure 11. Expected and observed SEDR for the
corrupted power order of Fig. 9.

In our linear ramp rate consideration, the expected
and observed SEDR should appear pulse-shaped,
displaying a constant nonzero value only when the
power order is being executed. The observed SEDR
profile shows noise, which can be attributed to the
error introduced by the approximations in the state
estimate process. For an uncompromised power order,
the expected and observed SEDR profiles should match
closely. This can be mathematically expressed as an
SEDR integral criterion:

Z

tf

Z

tf

SEDRobserved dt −
t0

SEDRexpected dt ≤ ε,
t0

(15)

where t0 and tf are the limits on the time period of
interest and ε signifies the acceptable margin of error.
If we set the upper limit tf to the time step ti , we can
compute the integral in real time as the state estimate
computations are completed, which allows a detection
time threshold to be assigned for a chosen value of
ε. The SEDR integral criterion allows the extension
of the detection strategy even when the ramp under
consideration is not linear.
One caveat is that if the power order is altered to a
value that is within the error bound of the state estimate,
it cannot be distinguished from an error. However,
if the error is maintained in a small interval, such a
compromised power order will result in a comparatively
less detrimental outcome. In effect, our approach
bounds the degree to which an adversary can corrupt a
power order and evade detection.

5.

Conclusion and Future Work

We investigated and verified our assumptions on
the fast, approximate state estimation process. Our
assumptions about measurement prioritization and
reduced iteration count were found to provide good
agreement with the true state of the system. A
simulation of the execution of the compromised power
order was done, and the state estimation errors involved
were used to qualitatively study the detection criteria.
The results of this paper show that the fast,
approximate state estimation process can be utilized
with promising results to detect malicious tampering
with power order commands—within a margin of
error—and make a large AC system with HVDC lines
more resilient to attack. Our results also provide a
means to identify the critical lines in a system for
which communication channels should be hardened to
be more resilient to a wider cyber-physical attack. Our
methodology can be further extended to other problems
of a similar nature that involve the time evolution of a
power system’s operating point.
Ongoing and future work will include
implementation in a real-time, simulation-based
hardware-in-loop environment to better reflect
the realities of cyber-physical systems in terms of
communication latency and asynchronous measurement
acquisition through SCADA protocols such as DNP3.
The sensitivity of the detection algorithm to topology
changes is another direction for future work. It will
be followed by investigation of mitigation strategies
for increasing the cyber-resiliency of HVDC systems.
Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves will
also be studied to investigate the diagnostic ability of
detection thresholds.
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